Fordham Law Review
Volume 14

Issue 1

Article 7

1945

Obiter Dicta

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Obiter Dicta, 14 Fordham L. Rev. 123 (1945).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol14/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS

1945]

123
1 •

business activity and that there were insufficient facts to warrant a disregard of
the entity.
The proposition concerning assignment of income in the principal case is primary and distinct from the proposition concerned with disregard of the corporate
entity. If the assignment was ineffectual to avoid imposition of income tax upon
the assignor, then the valid existence of the corporate assignee is irrelevant, since
the assignor becomes the responsible taxpayer. As a tax-saving d~vice, this recent
decision does not disclose a new loophole. At current -corporate normal3 5 and
surtax30 income tax rates, declared-value excess-profits tax rates 37 coupled with
the capital stock tax,38 and the excess profits tax rates,39 the corporation is scarcely
a shield against the incidence of income taxation. Earnings from personal services
cannot be effectively assigned. A valid assignment by parting with ownership of
income-producing property itself is a drastic device for avoiding taxes. Assignment
without the relinquishment of legal control and economic benefit is not likely to
receive a taxpayer's desired interpretation.

OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*
A

TRIBUTE TO MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND

On Monday December 18, 1944, a meeting of the Bar of the Supreme Court of
the United States was held in the Supreme Court Building. Its solemn purpose was
to take appropriate .action in memory of the late Mr. Justice Sutherland. Following
deserved tributes from Honorable George Wharton Pepper and Mr. Attorney General Biddle, Chief Justice Stone pronounced one of the most inspiring eulogies to

his former Associate Justice.
Despite the fact that the Chief Justice "was one of those who sometimes differed"
with Mr. Justice Sutherland, he paid eloquent tribute to his work on the Court
during his sixteen years of service. The Chief Justice said
in part: "Sound legal principles adequate to meet all the
Sutherland, J.,
Dissenting
vicissitudes of human experience never sprang full-fledged
from the brains of any man or group of men. They are the
ultimate resultant of the abrasive force of the clash of competing and sometimes
conflicting ideas-ideas which are rooted in different experiences and different
appraisals of all the multifarious interests which it is the concern of government to
foster and protect. The time will come when it will be recognized, perhaps more
clearly than it is at present, how fortunate it has been for the true progress of the
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

INT. REV. CODE § 13 (1939).
INT. REV. CODE § 15 (1939).
INT. REV. CODE § 600 (1939).
INT. REV, CODE § 1200 (1939).
INT. REV. CODE § 710 (1939).

*BuRRELL, OBITER DIcTA (1885)
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law that at a time when the trend was in the opposite direction, there sat upon this
Bench a man of stalwart independence, and of the purest character who, without
a trace of intellectual arrogance, and always with respectful toleration for the views
of colleagues who differed with him, fought stoutly for the constitutional guaranties
of the liberty of the individual." [89 L. Ed. 246 (1945)].
Then the Chief Justice followed with a pertinent reference to the current tendency to confusi change and progress in the law, and quoted from Mr. Justice Sutherland's address in 1917 when he was President of the American
The Torch
Bar Association: "I am not in favor of standing still. Of
course we must have .advance, but we must at our peril
of the Law
distinguish between real progress and what amounts to a
mere manifestation of the speed mania. Among the games of the ancient Greeks
there was a running match in which each participant carried a lighted torch. The
prize was awarded not to the one who crossed the line first, but to him who crossed
the line first with his torch still burning." [Id].
There has been manifest of late the false assumption that rapid change necessarily
spells improvement in the law. It may spell confusion and uncertainty. Elsewhere
(Kennedy, Portrait of the New Supreme Court (1944)
13 FoRDIHAf L. REv. 1-16) it has been noted that this
A Present
danger has been particularly pronounced in the recent deProblem
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which
disclose division and dissents in approximately 50% of the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the October 1944 Term and thus far in. the October 1945 Term. Warnings
are currently made by the Justices themselves against the precipitate uprooting of
settled precedents without a careful study of the immediate and remote consequences
of such overthrow of legal landmarks. The dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Stone
and Mr. Justice Jackson in United States v. South-eastern Underwriters Association,
322 U. S. 533 (1944) provide a present-day warning, in the words of Mr. Justice
Sutherland, that we "must at our peril distinguish between real progress and what
amounts to a mere manifestation of the speed mania."
W. B. K.
IS A HORSE A VEHICLE?

"Legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common
run of men and is therefore to be understood according to the sense of things,
as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words
addressed to him." So says Justice Frankfurter in Addison
Jural
v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod. Inc., 322 U. S. 607, 618 (1944).
Semantics
But the ascertainment of the sense of things can be a task
difficult of achievement. The captious mind of the lawyer often objects to, or
contravenes such literary bonds.
Subject of such controversy recently was the word "vehicle" in New York.
Douglass v. City of New York, - Misc. -, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 214 (City Ct. 1942),
rev'd, mein., 266 App. Div. 717, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 935 (1st Dep't 1943). A woman
was injured by a policeman's horse, while watching a parade in New York City. She
sought to hold the City liable for her injuries under § 50-b of the General Municipal
Law which, prior to the 1941 amendment, read, in part as follows: "Every city ...
shall be liable . . .for the negligence of a person duly appointed ... in the operation
of a municipally owned vehicle within the state in the discharge of a statutory
duty imposed upon such a person or municipality." Under this statute the munici-
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pality's common law immunity is reduced and the city is subjected to liability for
torts committed by its employees. The City admitted that the woman had been
injured as a result of the negligence of a person duly appointed while discharging
a statutory duty but the case allegedly failed on another requirement, namely, that
a horse could not be considered a "vehicle" within the meaning of the statute quoted
above. To support this contention the Corporation Counsel cited Bouvier's definiion of a vehicle which refers to vehicle as an "artificial contrivance," and Black's
definition which uses the same descriptive phrase. Counsel for the plaintiff, on the
other hand, invoked Webster's definition of a vehicle, namely, "a vehicle is anything
in or on which any person or thing is or may be carried." A horse, he contended,
would clearly come within this definition.
The term "vehicle" has been the subject of much litigation and has been held to
embrace many objects. So, a horse-drawn road grader, Sant v. Continental Life
Ins. Co. of St. Louis, 49 Idaho 691, 291 Pac. 1072 (1930);
a bicycle, People v. McDonald, 167 Misc. 670, 3 N. Y. S.
What is
(2d) 784 (City Ct. 1938); a sled, Long v. Hicks, 173 Wash.
a "Vehicle"?
17, 21 P. (2d) 281 (1933); a rowboat, MacKnigkt v. Fed.
Life Ins. Co., 278 Ill. App. 241 (1934); all were held to be vehicles. Even an elevenyear old boy drawing a little wagon was held to be "in charge of a vehicle" within
a statute regulating traffic signals. In this case a dairy truck backed over the boy
and it was defendant's contention that the boy was not within the protection of
the code requiring the defendant's driver to give the stated signal. But the court
held that the little wagon was a "vehicle" and the boy was entitled to be given the
signal. Spears Dairy v. Bohrer, Tex. Civ. App. 54 S. W. (2d) 872 (1932).
In the instant case, the learned Justices of the Appellate Division refused to decide
that the horse came within the term "vehicle." But the trial court had held that a
horse could properly be included within the term "vehicle."
Operation of
However, such a construction-that is substituting the term
"horse" for the term "vehicle"--would make the statute
a Horse?
read "in the operation of a . . . horse," "Operate" in its
ordinary sense is applied to mechanical and inanimate contrivances. Wit herstine v.
Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 235 N. Y. 168, 139 N. E. 229 (1923). Therefore, it would seem that one would not apply the word "operate" to an animate
object subject to its own volition. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that if animals
were not meant to be included the sfatute would have been worded "motor-driven
vehicles," whereas defense counsel contended that if the intent was that the statute
was to include animals, they would have been expressly mentioned. Both arguments
are subject to criticism: for the adjective "motor-driven" might prove too restrictive
of the term "vehicle" whereas, to enumerate fully all things covered by the term
would be a waste of words.
Later, in 1943, the question was again brought to the fore. A man was injured
while trying to stop a runaway horse, which had thrown its rider, a New York City
policeman. The injured man attempted to predicate the
City's liability on the basis of the new words annexed to
More Words
§ 50-b of the General Municipal Law by the legislature in
1941 and after the happening in the Douglass case. The amended statute now reads in
pertinent part as follows: "Every city ... shall be liable ... for the negligence of a
person duly appointed . . . in the operation of a municipally owned vehicle or other
facility of transportation .... " The italicized words were added by the legislature in
1941. The trial court still following the Douglass decision, refused to admit that the
horse came within the confines of the amended statute. It was said that since the stat-
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ute is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed. Therefore, the
court dismissed the complaint as to the defendant solely on the ground that § 50-b
did not extend the statutory waiver of governmental immunity to negligence in the
"operation" of a city-owned horse. On appeal, however, the Appellate Division
declared, two justices dissenting, that a horse could properly be considered "a
facility of transportation" within the meaning of the 1941 amendment. Bernadine v.
City of New York, 182 Misc. 609, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 881 (Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'd,
268 App. Div. 444, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 888 (1st Dep't 1944).
Two questions still remain to be answered. The first is what will be the effect
of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, in construing the amendment to § 50-b. Under
this doctrine when general words in a statute follow the enumeration of particular
words, the general words will be construed as qualified and limited to matters
or things of the same special character as those previously enumerated. People v.
Lamphere, 219 App. Div. 422, 219 N. Y. Supp. 390 (4th Dep't 1927). Applying
this doctrine of ejusdem generis to the amended words of the statute--"other facility
of transportation"-it would seem that they must be construed as applying to things
of the same character as the special word "vehicle," preceding them, namely inanimate objects. Therefore a horse would not be included in the general designation
of "facility of transportation." And another objection still remains. In the light
of the recent decision of the Appellate Division, which assimilated the word "horse,"
with "other facility of transportation," the statute would still be construed to read
"operation" of a horse!- Whether this construction was contemplated by the legislature or whether it is purely judicial fiction, the fact remains that it is an unusual
handling of common words.
A

TA -FREE PROFIT

Two years ago this Department of the Law Review considered the question
whether the expression "all moneys" contained in an English will included property
such as securities. (1943) 12 FoRDHAm L. REv. 202. In a
Is Money
recent tax case the Federal Court was called upon to deterProperty?
mine whether the-converse meaning is true, that is, whether
the word "property" used in the Internal Revenue Code
includes money. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its opinion in Tri-Lakes
Steamship Company v. Commissionr of Internal Revenue, 146 F. (2d) 970 (C. C. A.
6th, 1945) stated and applied the general rule that the term property in its ordinary
and natural meaning was sufficiently comprehensive to include money. Comment
(1935) 4 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 307. The Court furthermore dispelled the belief, vitalized by an obiter dicta of the Board of Tax Appeals in an earlier case (Stinson
Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 141), that money did not constitute property
within the meaning of Section 112 (b) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code which
provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized upon receipt by a corporation of
"property" distributed in complete liquidation of a subsidiary.
In the Tri-Lakes case the taxpayer had acquired the stock of the subsidiary for
$29,000 and received therefor on the complete liquidation of the subsidiary $207,000
in cash. The Commissioner contended that the difference,
A Profit
$178,000, was taxable income. The taxpayer contended that
Made
there was no taxable income because the money bad been
received as a tax-free distribution within the meaning of
Section 112 (b) (6). The decision of the Circuit Court that a cash distribution was
intended by Congress to be comprehended by "property" distribution as used in

